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Scientific and policy bodies’ failure to acknowledge and act on the 
evidence base for airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a timely way 
is both a mystery and a scandal. In this study, we applied theories 
from Bourdieu to address the question, “How was a partial and 
partisan scientific account of SARS-CoV-2 transmission constructed 
and maintained, leading to widespread imposition of infection control 
policies which de-emphasised airborne transmission?”. 
Methods: 
From one international case study (the World Health Organisation) 
and three national ones (UK, Canada and Japan), we selected a 
purposive sample of publicly available texts including scientific 
evidence summaries, guidelines, policy documents, public 
announcements, and social media postings. To analyse these, we 
applied Bourdieusian concepts of field, doxa, scientific capital, illusio, 
and game-playing. We explored in particular the links between 
scientific capital, vested interests, and policy influence. 
Results: 
Three fields—political, state (policy and regulatory), and 
scientific—were particularly relevant to our analysis. Political and 
policy actors at international, national, and regional level 
aligned—predominantly though not invariably—with medical scientific 
orthodoxy which promoted the droplet theory of transmission and 
considered aerosol transmission unproven or of doubtful relevance. 
This dominant scientific sub-field centred around the clinical discipline 
of infectious disease control, in which leading actors were hospital 
clinicians aligned with the evidence-based medicine movement. 
Aerosol scientists—typically, chemists, and engineers—representing 
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the heterodoxy were systematically excluded from key decision-
making networks and committees. Dominant discourses defined 
these scientists’ ideas and methodologies as weak, their empirical 
findings as untrustworthy or insignificant, and their contributions to 
debate as unhelpful. 
Conclusion: 
The hegemonic grip of medical infection control discourse remains 
strong. Exit from the pandemic depends on science and policy finding 
a way to renegotiate what Bourdieu called the ‘rules of the scientific 
game’—what counts as evidence, quality, and rigour.
Keywords 
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Introduction
The droplet v aerosol debate
                    “A good scientist is someone who has a sense of the 
scientific game”
                                                             – Pierre Bourdieu (page 83)1
When the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared 
COVID-19 a “pandemic” on 11th March 2020, the virus had 
already caused 100,000 known cases and 4,000 deaths in 
114 countries. The WHO had summarised its recommenda-
tions for reducing spread of the disease in a widely-disseminated 
90-second video animation released on 28th February 2020, 
entitled ‘How is COVID-19 spread and how do you protect 
yourself against it?’ (source A4, Table 1). Its full text was as 
follows (emphasis added):
     “COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by a new 
coronavirus introduced to humans for the first time. It is 
spread from person to person mainly through the droplets 
produced when an infected person speaks, coughs or 
sneezes. These droplets can land in the mouths or noses 
of people who are nearby. These droplets are too heavy to 
travel far in the air – they only travel approximately one 
metre and quickly settle on surfaces. This is the reason 
person-to-person spread is happening between close 
contacts. The exact time that the virus can survive on 
surfaces is not yet known. So it is wise to clean surfaces 
regularly, particularly in the vicinity of people infected 
with COVID-19. Hands touch many surfaces, which 
can be contaminated with the virus. You should there-
fore avoid touching your eyes, nose or mouth, since 
contaminated hands can transfer the virus from the 
surface to yourself. When coughing or sneezing, cover 
your mouth and nose with the bend of your elbow or use 
a disposable tissue. If a tissue is used, discard it immedi-
ately into a closed bin. The most effective way to prevent 
the spread of the new coronavirus is to wash hands 
frequently with an alcohol-based hand rub or soap and 
water. This will eliminate the virus if it is on your hands. 
Stay healthy and prevent the spread of COVID-19.” 
(World Health Organisation, 28th February 2020; Source 
A4, Table 1)
The underlined sections in the above quote, which reflect a 
droplet mode of transmission, are scientifically questionable 
(and in our view incorrect). The SARS-CoV-2 virus can travel 
long distances in the air where it remains viable for up to eight 
hours; spread is not always ‘person to person’; the virus enters 
the body mainly by inhalation via the lungs; handwashing and 
surface cleansing are relatively minor ways of preventing 
spread; and airborne spread is the main mechanism of transmis-
sion even within a one-metre distance2–5. If the virus was spread 
predominantly through large droplets, prevention should 
focus on reducing direct contact, cleaning surfaces, physical 
barriers (such as plastic screens), physical distancing (e.g., two 
metres or six feet) and masking within that distance, and high-
grade protection for healthcare staff when conducting so-called 
‘aerosol-generating medical procedures’ (AGMPs). But given 
that transmission is predominantly airborne, different measures 
are needed including ventilation, air filtration, reducing crowding 
and time spent indoors, greater attention to the quality and fit of 
masks, more widespread masking when indoors, and extensive 
higher-grade protection for healthcare and other at-risk staff. 
Measures to counter aerosol transmission are more difficult, 
more costly in the short term, and (therefore) politically less 
popular.
We acknowledge that not all scientists accept the statements 
in the previous paragraph – see for example 6,7. Indeed, non- 
acceptance of the theory of airborne spread is the central focus 
of this paper. Our aim is not to contribute to the scientific stand-
off between ‘droplet’ and ‘airborne’ theories (we have done 
that elsewhere2,8), but to analyse why, in the face of consider-
able evidence in support of airborne spread, this stand-off is 
happening and why theories of transmission which dismiss the 
aerosol route continue to dominate policy in many settings.
We write (in autumn 2021) with a sense of urgency, at a time 
when pandemic fatigue is palpable but hundreds of thousands of 
new cases of COVID-19 are occurring daily. Children are return-
ing to face-to-face learning in contexts which often empha-
sise droplet—and, to a lesser extent, fomite—precautions 
(especially physical distancing, separation of learners by plas-
tic screens, and handwashing) over airborne ones (such as 
opening windows, masking in classrooms, and reducing time 
spent indoors)9,10. Droplet and fomite theories also dominate in 
healthcare facilities, where the emphasis remains on physical dis-
tancing, cleaning surfaces, and handwashing11, and where work 
(with few exceptions) is divided into formally-designated AGMPs, 
such as intubation, for which higher-grade personal protective 
equipment (PPE) is needed and all other tasks (non-AGMPs), 
in which, it is assumed, no significant aerosols are generated12. 
Whereas AGMPs are mostly undertaken by senior doctors, more 
junior staff who attend to coughing and breathless patients in poorly 
ventilated spaces can rarely access high-grade PPE.
The arguments about the importance of aerosol transmis-
sion, therefore, could not be more pressing or more politically 
charged. Against this background, our research questions are as 
follows:
•  How have the symbolic and hegemonic struggles 
for power and influence among two subfields of 
health sciences, one of which promotes traditional 
contact-and-droplet infection control precautions and 
the other that promotes aerosol precautions, shaped 
the regulation and practice of infection control at 
international, national, and local level?
          Amendments from Version 2
Version 3 is the same as version 2 except for some typos 
pointed out by Reviewer 1 have been corrected. Specifically, after 
removing one of the four original case studies (from USA), we 
had omitted to correct “four case studies” to “three case studies” 
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•  How did these positions of influence arise – and how 
are they maintained?
•  What would need to change in order for heterodox 
science of critical import, i.e., from aerosol scientists, 
to exert more influence on policy?
In the next sections, we introduce our theoretical perspective, 
methodology, and dataset before describing the international 
policy context and four national or regional case studies. In the 
analysis, we present our Bourdieusian theorisation of the contri-
bution of two competing scientific sub-fields to a fast-moving, 
politically- and ideologically-charged crisis situation, high-
lighting not just their epistemological assumptions and 
preferred methodologies but also (in one case) the field’s hard-
won and fiercely-defended hegemonic power and (in the other) its 
drawn-out struggle for legitimacy and influence. In the dis-
cussion, we offer some theoretically driven possibilities for a 
difficult but mission-critical renegotiation of the ‘rules of the 
game’. 
Theoretical approach
We use Bourdieu’s linked concepts of fields, doxa, capital, 
and illusio to understand how individuals and institutions 
draw on varied forms of resources, and a range of beliefs and 
assumptions, in order to navigate their relations and positions 
and achieve their interests.
For Bourdieu, the social world is highly political. It is shaped 
by agents’ involvement in struggles to impose their views on 
and wield their power over others. But those struggles are not 
cynical games played by rational actors, nor are they the deter-
ministic effects of structural forces on passive actors. By 
virtue of their habitus (durable, transposable dispositions 
which structure how they perceive the world and act within it), 
Bourdieusian agents are both products and creators of their 
social environments13. The way habitus is formed over time 
and through repetition accounts for the taken-for-granted prac-
tices and deeply-held assumptions among groups of people in 
specific fields of relations.
Social struggles for the imposition of truth, prestige and 
resources are located in – and specific to – particular fields 
(which Bourdieu defined as specific areas of the broader social 
space14,15). The relative value of different types of capital (eco-
nomic, social, cultural and symbolic) as well as internalised 
rules and vested interests in the game (illusio) both define the 
field’s boundaries and are shaped by it 16. Practically, being 
part of a field means having more in common with your foes 
within that field than with others outside the field. Agents 
within a field will share compatible assessment of the relative 
position and prestige of others. Symbolic capital – the clout and 
prestige one can effectively mobilise –will vary from one field 
to the next.
The concept of field rests on a tension between, on the one hand, 
each field’s autonomy and specificities and, on the other, its 
imbrication in a shared social space and relations of power 
(champ du pouvoir). For a field to be sociologically relevant, it 
needs to be structured by its agents’ common intertwined habi-
tus and illusio. But no field is ever entirely disconnected from 
all the others, because—at the micro level—the same agents 
are involved in multiple fields and—at the macro level—fields 
overlap and interconnect.
Bourdieu13 defines the concept of doxa as a set of deeply 
held and taken for granted assumptions among people in a 
particular context. While some beliefs get established and 
they are considered as legitimate (orthodoxy), other forms 
of emergent beliefs remain outside the established order and 
are considered marginal (heterodox) to it. Each scientific field— 
and other fields of relations—has orthodoxies and heterodoxies. 
The orthodoxy retains its control over what counts as 
rigour and relevance, what is possible, and what is acceptable 
(in this case scientifically). The heterodoxy challenges the power 
and influence of orthodoxy on defining the terms of science. 
Some scientific sub-disciplines are considered more proto-
typical (normatively idealised as scientific) than others; some 
are considered typical (conforming to general expectations of 
science) and some atypical (underrepresented or devalued in 
relation to other disciplines). Broadly speaking, ‘hard’, ‘pure’, 
‘mathematical’, and ‘exact’ sciences are valued and idealised, 
forming orthodoxies, while ‘soft’, ‘applied’, ‘social’, and ‘inexact’ 
sciences tend to be less valued in comparison, and relegated 
often to heterodox positions. Heterodoxy could bring innovation 
from the margins, if cultivated and better regarded by the lead-
ership17. Heterodox evidence would find better reception in 
scientific contexts that value interdisciplinarity, multidisci-
plinarity and transdisciplinarity and recognise the innovative 
potential of pluralism over purism.
Science capital is a term which Archer et al. developed18, based 
on Bourdieusian term of cultural capital, which refers to the 
knowledge, education, intellect, insight, skills, and understand-
ing that an individual could deploy to shape their status and 
power in a particular field. In the case of scientific capital, indi-
viduals garner knowledge, skills, and abilities that help them 
gain status, recognition, power, and access to resources such 
as research grants and contracts, and to get their scientific 
knowledge widely used. Inter-field struggles for status and pres-
tige could warp how certain forms of science capital may be 
recognised and valued while other forms are marginalised.  
Three fields
The decisions at play lie at the intersection of at least three 
fields. First, the properly political field of agents vying, mostly 
through symbolic struggles, for elected positions within the 
national and regional jurisdictions19 as well as the mediatic eco-
system whose function is to make public the events occurring in 
that field. For Bourdieu, the political field is not to be con-
fused with the State, despite the control that agents involved 
in it can have on the State. The political field and the strategies 
of its agents are structured by political parties and factions, 
and the quest for prestige and centrality.
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Second, the public health policy administration as a func-
tion of the state and as a sub-field of the bureaucracy field (a 
different but overlapping field to academic public health). 
Bourdieu extends the Weberian notion of the state’s monopoly 
over legitimate physical violence to a capacity to impose its 
own categories and exert symbolic violence – that is, a type 
of non-physical violence manifested in the power differential 
between social groups. The pandemic revealed the pow-
ers which the sub-field of public health has to impose physi-
cal and symbolic violence, sometimes embedded in specific 
laws, and brought those to the forefront of daily lives. But the 
transnational nature of the pandemic also brought interna-
tional public health bodies (notably the WHO) to play a role in 
many national symbolic struggles. Notably, the policy-regulatory 
field is not unified. It also includes competing statutes of 
various kinds and legal decisions, some of which uphold and 
others that challenge the status quo.
Finally, the field of science per se, which Bourdieu depicted 
as structured by symbolic struggles for positions, prestige, and 
so on. Even in sub-fields where the ‘purest’ science (such as 
particle physics) is produced and reproduced, that science is in 
some respects a social field like all others—with its relations of 
force, its powers, its struggles and profits, its generic mechanisms 
such as those that regulate the selection of newcomers or the 
competition between the various producers14. Fields and sub-
fields help progress specialist science by developing normative 
standards and supporting greater rigor within those standards—
but they also bring a risk of balkanization, with the triple haz-
ards of “monopoly, monotony, and isolation”20. Bourdieu also 
emphasises that the field is constituted by the common illusio 
needed to perceive the distinction between orthodox and 
heterodox positions14. Recognition of this distinction is important 
for scientific progress as heterodox science challenges the very 
monopoly, monotony and isolation that the scientific orthdoxy 
upholds.
In sum, a dynamic understanding of struggles of symbolic 
power and control among politics, State and scientific subfields 
provides a unique lens through which we can consider the 
extent to which the evidence of aerosol scientists was not 
merely overlooked but symbolically degraded by the hegemonic 
scientific order.
Methods
The study was conducted between March and April 2021, using 
a purposive sample of sources including policy documents, 
public statements, press articles, tweets from organisations, 
videos, letters, and academic and grey literature publications 
produced during the pandemic (or, in a few cases, before it). 
Sources were selected for their contribution to building some 
hard cases that would help us answer the research questions set 
out above about how power struggles arose and played out 
between scientists promoting contact-and-droplet transmission 
and those promoting aerosol transmission. Initially, we chose to 
develop three in-depth cases of how the science was interpreted 
and drawn upon in worker-employer disputes in three differ-
ent countries, because the stories and issues were prominent 
in the media at the time and familiar to the authors. As described 
below, we added a contrasting case and international con-
text as our analysis progressed. Following our approach to the 
University of Oxford’s Medical Sciences Division Research 
Ethics Committee, a representative from the University’s 
Research Services (Ethics and Integrity) Department confirmed 
that formal ethics approval was unnecessary because the study 
was desk research, all sources were in the public domain and 
social media postings from individual accounts were excluded.
With a view to drawing out the Bourdieusian theoretical ele-
ments described in the previous section, we sought to study 
phenomena at two interconnected levels: at an individual level, 
the dispositions and practices of individual agents (including 
scientists, policymakers, and front-line workers); and at a more 
macro level, the external social structures which formed the 
strategic terrain within which these human agents assessed 
reality, made choices, and took action.
Bourdieu’s empirical work is essentially focused on two such 
intersections. First, the intersection between the conceptual 
apparatus he developed (field, doxa, habitus, illusio, objectifi-
cation, symbolic struggle, etc.) and their practical applications 
to understand day-to-day behaviours and lived experiences. 
Second, the intersection between the individual and social lev-
els through what Bourdieu called ‘double binds’ between the 
structuring and the structured structures21.
Many of Bourdieu’s most important contributions15,22,23 rest 
on an in-depth, careful analysis of micro-level data and 
lived experiences to support a dialogical back and forth 
between theory and macro-level systematization. We adopted 
a similar dialogical approach in our own work here, with the 
acknowledged limitation that without an empirical compo-
nent the micro-level data available to us were limited and only 
from secondary sources. Using the techniques of critical social 
science (close reading, reflexivity, discussion, theorisation), 
we sought to understand both the behaviour and motivations 
of individual actors and the various external forces which were 
driving that behaviour. In the same way, we rely on illustrative 
cases and micro-level data such as statements, administrative 
decisions, or events to build a broader social level explanation 
of the processes at stake.
To allow for detailed close reading and micro-analysis, we 
selected five small datasets, which served as a window to a much 
wider set of issues. One – chosen to provide the international 
policy context – centres on the early (and to some extent, con-
tinuing) alignment of WHO policy and guidance with a drop-
let mode of transmission. The others were chosen to provide 
contrasting examples of how this WHO guidance was inter-
preted and actioned at national and regional level. Three case 
studies centre on different challenges to policymakers from 
healthcare workers (UK) and healthcare workers and classroom 
teachers (Canada). In these, we began with the small-scale 
social situation and ‘zoomed out’ to ask what wider and more 
distant influences were relevant. We were interested primarily in 
what key actors believed to be scientifically true, right, and rea-
sonable – and why they considered certain facts to be untrue or 
unimportant and certain courses of action to be inappropriate or 
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unnecessary. A final case study, from Japan (selected from sev-
eral Asian countries which took similar approaches), illustrates 
a contrasting policy approach in which airborne spread of the 
virus was accepted and acted on at an early stage.
The texts and transcripts used to construct these case stud-
ies are shown in Table 1, which provides hyperlinks to online 
sources. Identification of most of these sources occurred through 
systematic citation-tracking from the first document identi-
fied. For example, a tweet or press article might link to a policy 
announcement which in turn cited a policy document, which 
referenced some peer-reviewed (or not) research studies. Our 
dataset was thus built using not technical decisions (e.g., using 
formal inclusion or exclusion criteria) but hermeneutic ones 
(the contribution of the source to building a richer picture of 
the case)24. In each case, we ceased data collection once all 
authors agreed that the story was sufficiently detailed to allow 
meaningful theoretical analysis. Importantly, we included all 
disconfirming data—that is, material which initially appeared to 
contradict our preliminary interpretations—and used this mate-
rial to seek out more nuanced explanations. No data source 
was excluded from the analysis, though for space reasons 
we have omitted some details.
Case descriptions
The World Health Organisation. At the WHO’s first 
international press conference on the new, as-yet unnamed 
coronavirus on 11th February 2020 (source A2, Table 1), its 
Director-General began by emphasising the importance of 
handwashing and using paper tissues to catch sneezes. Whilst he 
went on to state (page 10) that “corona[virus 19] is airborne”, 
he shortly afterwards corrected himself:
       “Okay. Sorry, I used the military word, airborne. It 
meant to spread via droplets or respiratory transmis-
sion. Please take it that way; not the military language. 
Thank you.” (source A2, Table 1, page 12)
As its current guidance on the topic (source A1, Table 125) 
states, the term ‘military’ reflects the WHO’s advisory role on 
biological weapons, in which unknown respiratory patho-
gens are routinely classified as airborne threats—hence, poten-
tially extremely perilous—until firm evidence allows them to 
be reclassified.
The corrected message that SARS-CoV-2 was “not airborne” 
had limited impact initially - public health officials inspect-
ing outbreaks in newly-affected countries donned scarce hazmat 
suits, for example. In the face of what appeared to be exces-
sive caution by these countries, and in the context of a global 
shortage of PPE26, the WHO found it necessary to underline its 
message with a ‘fact check’ Tweet (source A5, Table 1) on the 
28th March 2020 stating “COVID-19 is NOT airborne” to coun-
ter what it called ‘fake news’ about potential airborne spread 
and re-emphasise contact and droplet modes of transmission.
This uncompromising message from the WHO in March 2020 
may partly explain why politicians and policymakers in the 
West rapidly aligned with a droplet theory of transmission 
and ignored, downplayed, or rejected the work of scientists 
proposing an airborne route.
Scientific briefings produced by the WHO (e.g., source A11, 
Table 1) and national policy bodies (see next sections) reveal 
longstanding errors in the science of bioaerosols which have 
been perpetrated in derivative publications over the years. In 
particular, three flawed assumptions, whose origins can be 
traced to the limitations of scientific equipment in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries27, distorted the thinking of policy-
makers and the non-expert scientists who were advising them: 
that there is a clear dichotomy between droplets (above five 
microns) and aerosols (below five microns); that the former 
explain transmission of respiratory diseases within two metres 
whereas the latter account only for transmission beyond that 
distance; and that transmission dynamics of bioaerosols in 
coughs, sneezes and exhaled air are linear and predictable5,8. 
These three oversimplifications may have been unconsciously 
seized upon by policymakers through a process of satisfic-
ing – that is, in the face of urgency, threat, and uncertainty, 
ensuring that their decisions made sense and were account-
able within a selected range of parameters28. Droplet theory, 
especially when anything below five microns was incorrectly 
defined as a droplet (in reality, particles of up to 100 microns 
can be carried long distances in the air), made possible the 
individualist “how to protect yourself…” message (source A4, 
Table 1) based on personal cleanliness and a simple physi-
cal distancing rule. If these were the key measures needed, 
the WHO would not have to concern itself with such mat-
ters as the chemistry of air composition, the physics of air flow, 
or the architecture of the built environment; it reduced the risk 
of mass panic at the idea of uncontrolled spread of a new and 
poorly-understood disease through the very air we breathe; and 
it made the worldwide shortage of PPE less urgent.
The WHO’s position on prevention of COVID-19 up to early 
2021 was based largely on advice from its Infection Preven-
tion and Control Research and Development Expert Group 
for COVID-19 (IPCRDEG-C19). Most members of that com-
mittee are hospital clinicians with specialist training in infec-
tious diseases; they were also strong adherents to the tenets of 
evidence-based medicine, which is based on empiricist assump-
tions and reluctant to consider types of evidence beyond 
randomised controlled trials, as its briefing document on guide-
line development attests (source A20, Table 1). As public health 
professor Raina MacIntyre described in a blog (source A15, 
Table 1), these committee members are experts in topics such 
as wound management—for which droplet spread is predomi-
nant and handwashing is an effective intervention. A leading 
member of the IPCRDEG’s Secretariat recently led an interna-
tional handwashing campaign “to consistently improve hand 
hygiene practices as a whole-of-society approach to stop the 
spread of SARS-CoV-2” (source A18, Table 129).
On 6th July 2020, 238 aerosol scientists from around the 
world published an open letter addressed to international 
policymaking bodies—among which the WHO was implicitly 
highlighted—summarising studies undertaken by its signatories 
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which had demonstrated “beyond any reasonable doubt” 
that the SARS-CoV-2 virus is released in particles small 
enough to be carried long distances in the air when people talk, 
cough, and even just exhale (source A8, Table 13). Three days 
later, following press coverage of the letter—some some-
what negative (source A9, Table 130) and some more positive 
(source A10, Table 131)—the WHO published a new Scientific 
Brief on Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (source A11, Table 132). 
This document, which remains current at the time of writing, 
acknowledged the existence of various aerosol studies but con-
sidered those studies flawed in various ways and concluded 
that “transmission of SARS-CoV-2 by this type of aerosol route 
[i.e. coughing, speaking, singing, breathing] has not been 
demonstrated”31. 
A few weeks later, members of the IPCRDEG-C19 com-
mittee published an article (source A12, Table 17) with its 
Chair as lead author, declaring that “Multiple clinical and 
epidemiologic reports have now lent considerable support that 
the predominant route of human-to-human transmission of the 
SARS-CoV-2 is through respiratory droplets and/or contact 
routes and do not support significant airborne transmission” 
(7, page 2). The academic sources cited in that paper to substan-
tiate the droplet theory were remarkably sparse: they consisted 
of a report of person-to-person transmission within a single 
family33, a single hospital case in which air samples had been 
negative for the virus34, and a single air flight in which nobody 
got infected35. A letter to the editor (source A14, Table 136) 
argued that the paper was highly selective in its citation of evi-
dence (e.g., it omitted several studies which had found viable virus 
in the air) and included some fundamental errors of reasoning 
(e.g., conflating what the authors took to be lack of evi-
dence in favour of aerosol spread with evidence refuting such 
spread)36.
Some WHO documents contain a key logical fallacy that domi-
nance of close-contact transmission excludes a major role 
for aerosols. For example, in its July scientific brief (source 
A11, Table 1), the WHO states: “Current evidence suggests that 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 occurs primarily between people 
through direct, indirect, or close contact with infected people 
through infected secretions such as saliva and respiratory 
secretions, or through their respiratory droplets”32. This 
flawed logic was widely reproduced in national-level scientific 
briefings. For example, the US Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention’s scientific brief from October 2020 
states: “The epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 indicates that 
most infections are spread through close contact, not 
airborne transmission”37. As noted above, aerosol transmission 
occurs predominantly at close contact5, so dominance of 
close-contact transmission cannot be taken as evidence that 
droplet mode dominates.
Whilst the WHO has shifted its position substantially since 
the beginning of 2021 (for example, recommending ventila-
tion of indoor spaces alongside handwashing and physical 
distancing from March 2021 – source A17, Table 138), its guid-
ance at the time of writing remains primarily focused on measures 
to reduce close-range droplet transmission except in 
the specific circumstances of AGMPs, as its living guideline 
(source A16, Table 139) points out. A living systematic review 
of the role of airborne transmission commissioned by the 
WHO and including the Chair of the IPCRDEG-C19 as a 
co-author was published as a preprint on 24th March 2021 (source 
A19, Table 16). It considered that no firm conclusions could be 
drawn about airborne transmission and observed that “Among 
case clusters for which airborne transmission is hypothesised, 
published detailed investigations cannot rule out that droplet 
and fomite transmission could also explain human-to-human 
transmission.” (6, page 4). Notably, neither the living guideline 
nor the living systematic review included any aerosol scientists 
as co-authors. 
The members of the WHO’s IPCRDEG had impressive cre-
dentials in the fields of both medical science and national 
policymaking. Its Chair, for example, is a Professor of Medi-
cine and past President of the Canadian Infectious Disease 
Society, past Board Chairman of the Canadian Committee on 
Antibiotic Resistance, and a recipient of a Distinguished Serv-
ice Medal from the Alberta Medical Association and the Order 
of Canada for Services to Medicine (source A21, Table 1). 
A Bourdieusian analytic lens would observe that the higher 
an individual’s endowment of capitals, the stronger the stakes 
in a game they would have. In such a high-stakes game, 
highly endowed become the custodians of power, privilege, 
and boundary conditions of the game. Given their position of 
seniority and legitimacy within the field and the associated 
capitals, it would be difficult for them to challenge the rules of 
the game (the illusio) from within and to accept knowledge from 
the margins.
United Kingdom. Our UK example centres around an open 
letter sent to the UK Prime Minister on 19th February 2021, 
led by the Royal College of Nursing and signed by 18 other 
healthcare workers’ organisations including paramedics, podia-
trists, nutritionists, speech and language therapists, and porters 
(source B3, Table 140). The authors asked for better ventilation 
and higher-grade PPE across a wide range of healthcare settings 
and extending beyond AGMPs.
The open letter challenged the UK’s current COVID-19 Infec-
tion Prevention and Control (IPC) Guidance (source B1, 
Table 141), updated in January 2021, which restricted higher-
grade PPE to staff—mostly senior doctors—performing AGMPs. 
It also criticised a state-commissioned ‘rapid review’ document 
published by the Antimicrobial Resistance and Healthcare 
Associated Infection (ARHAI) (source B2, Table 142), on 
which the IPC guidance was based. The ARHAI review was 
labelled ‘Version 11.0’; it concluded (as the previous 10 ver-
sions had done) that the predominant mode of transmission was 
large droplets at short range and that there was “no clear evi-
dence” (page 9) for airborne spread outside AGMPs; a version 
12 published a few weeks later contains the same claims.
An independent evidence assessment commissioned by the 
Royal College of Nursing (source B4, Table 143) described the 
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ARHAI rapid review as flawed and outdated. Front-line nurses 
gave media interviews describing their concerns about work-
ing with minimal protection when patients were unwell and 
coughing, backed up by aerosol scientists who agreed that cough-
ing would generate virus-laden aerosols for which standard 
masks were inadequate protection. In one such interview, the pre-
senter reminded the audience that Health Protection Scotland’s 
latest advice is that there is no evidence to support a change in 
recommendations and that the Health Secretary had said they 
would be ‘‘guided by the experts’ (a reference to infectious 
diseases doctors). She is quoted:
       We take that really seriously and have adapted the PPE 
that we provide. But we also have a situation where 
individual members of staff in NHS or in care are able 
to exercise their own professional judgement about 
the circumstance that they face and whether or not they 
believe that they need additional PPE to that that is 
currently clinically recommended (Scottish Health 
Secretary, quoted on Good Morning Scotland, 2nd March 
2021 – source B5, Table 1)
We consider this deflection to ‘own professional judgement’ 
further in our analysis section.
Also noteworthy in this case is the publication on 5th March 
2021 of new Public Health England guidance on ventilation 
of indoor spaces (source B6, Table 144). In an exact mirror of 
the WHO—and citing the WHO’s new roadmap on ventilation, 
published a few days earlier (source A17, Table 138)—this new 
policy document appeared to base its recommendations on an 
assumed airborne route of transmission but was not accompanied 
by substantial changes to its other policy documents.
A key player in this case study is the instigator and lead author 
of the letter to the Prime Minister, the Professional Lead of 
the Infection Prevention and Control Network at the Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN) (source A22, Table 1). She is a regis-
tered nurse, with many years’ clinical experience along with a 
two-year secondment managing professional standards at the 
RCN. The Professional Lead role requires her to engage with 
front-line nurses and ensure the highest standards of infec-
tion control in their clinical work. She is the person within the 
nurses’ professional body to whom registered nurses would 
direct their concerns about unsafe practices. As the letter she 
drafted (source B3, Table 140) illustrates, she appears to feel a 
strong sense of moral responsibility to prevent further deaths of 
frontline healthcare workers.
Canada. In this case study, we focus on guidance relating to 
schools in one Canadian province, British Columbia, and a legal 
challenge by healthcare workers in another province, Quebec.
From the very beginning of the pandemic, British Columbia 
based its prevention measures on an explicit contact, droplet, 
and fomite theory of transmission. A tweet posted by from 
British Columbia’s Centre for Disease Control (source C1, Table 1) 
on 11th February 2020, for example, linked to a video by a physician 
epidemiologist and stated: “The new #coronavirus is spread 
by droplets that come from the mouth or nose. The droplets 
don’t stay floating in the air. This is not an airborne virus.”
Many interventions, such as the state-wide policy of closing 
children’s playgrounds and disabling traffic light push buttons, 
revealed a prevailing fear of droplet and fomite transmission. 
But as evidence on airborne transmission accumulated dur-
ing the late spring and summer of 2020, pressure from workers’ 
unions, supported by aerosol scientist researchers, mounted 
for the province to adopt measures to reduce airborne spread.
However, the province authorities long resisted the idea of air-
borne transmission. British Columbia’s Provincial Health 
Officer described the open letter from 238 international aerosol 
scientists as “a little bit of a tempest in a teapot […]” and 
reiterated her confidence in the existing advice focused on large 
droplets and surface transmission (source C3, Table 145). It 
was not until early January 2021 that the British Columbia 
Center for Disease Control (BCCDC) edited its guidelines to 
include the risk posed by “smaller droplets” (which may be a 
euphemism for aerosols):
       “Smaller droplets come out of the mouth and nose at 
the same time as larger droplets. These smaller droplets 
are light, and they can float in the air for a longer time. 
Because of this, smaller droplets may collect in enclosed 
spaces unless they are diluted with clean air from 
the outdoors or from a ventilation system. If many peo-
ple are sharing a space without enough clean air, it 
can lead to COVID-19 infections.” (source C6, Table 146)
Despite stopping short of the use of words such as ‘aerosols’ 
or ‘airborne’, the new guideline was welcomed by front-line 
workers. But it still provided ambiguous messages on masks 
and omitted any directives to improve ventilation in schools. 
Extraordinarily, school officials in one locality ordered class-
room windows to be screwed shut after teachers had opened 
them to increase ventilation (source C11, Table 147).
The Provincial Health Officer for British Columbia is a 
highly-respected medical doctor. She had initial special-
ist training in infectious diseases and a distinguished career in 
military medicine, as well as working for the WHO interna-
tionally, and subsequently trained in public health. She was 
the public health lead in Toronto for the 2003 SARS outbreak, 
and in 2018 was the first woman to be named as chief medi-
cal officer for British Columbia. Her regional role during the 
Covid-19 pandemic, including regular media briefings to explain 
aspects of the science to the public, made her a household 
name in the state and conferred legitimacy and authority on her 
statements (source C12, Table 1). She appears at least partly 
driven by the urge to quell panic and maintain calm—which 
may explain her ‘storm in a teacup’ comment and, more gener-
ally, her reluctance to embrace theories about the dominance of 
aerosol transmission.
In Quebec, a dispute about airborne transmission of the virus 
ended up in the courts. In April 2020, during the first wave 
of the pandemic, Quebec’s Nurses Union (FIQ) asked the 
province’s National Institute of Public Health (INSPQ) that 
they mandate the use of N95 masks (a kind of respirator provid-
ing high-grade protection against aerosols) in long term care 
facilities where most of the COVID-19 cases were occur-
ring (source C13, Table 1). However, INPSQ’s advice was 
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based on a theory of large droplet and fomite transmission 
(source C16, Table 1) and this view shaped the institutional 
response. It was illustrated, for example, by a report from 
around the same time in which one regional hospital net-
work publicly blamed employees’ sloppy handwashing to 
explain a COVID-19 outbreak (source C14, Table 1).
The first wave of the Covid19 pandemic took a very hard toll 
on Quebec’s long-term care residents and workers. Between 
March 2020 and February 2021, 13% of the 40,000 people 
institutionalized in a long-term care institution in Quebec died 
from Covid-19 (source C22, Table 1). In some institutions, 
virtually all residents became infected and so few workers 
remained that at one point the Canadian military was called in to 
take over (source C15, Table 1). Notably, the army provided N95 
masks for all their troops undertaking this work (source C15, 
Table 1).
Nevertheless, aligning with the orthodox view, Quebec’s Direc-
tor of Public Health published an ordonnance on 8th June 2020 
forbidding the use of N95 masks for health professionals 
save for a few designated procedures (source C17, Table 1). 
On 10th July 2020, after losing hope of finding a negotiated set-
tlement on their request for N95 masks, the FIQ brought the 
matter to a labour tribunal (source C18, Table 1). The Nurses 
Union claimed there was no shortage of N95 masks and that 
denying nurses this higher-grade protection was going to cost 
lives (source C19, Table 1). The availability of sufficient N95 
masks was later confirmed by the minister of health (source 
C20, Table 1). By that time, more than 17,000 health care 
workers had been infected (source C20, Table 1).
The legal action ended with a scathing legal ruling in March 
2021. The employer had argued, through an expert witness from 
the Public Health Institute of Quebec (INSPQ), that there 
was no evidence of significant airborne transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 and that standard medical masks were adequate 
protection. In upholding the nurses’ case, the judge decried 
INSPQ’s expert for using ‘false arguments’ and ‘fallacies’, and 
another expert for being unaware of key scientific developments 
in his field when testifying. The ruling also noted that, “despite 
[an] emerging scientific consensus, the INSPQ maintains, 
in court, the position that there is no air transmission” (source 
C22, Table 1 paragraph 143). Interestingly, shortly afterward, 
a group of 109 health professionals, most of them doctors and 
nurses from infectious diseases backgrounds, wrote a public letter 
contesting the scientific soundness of the ruling (source C23, 
Table 1). The letter states, for example:
       “Given the lack of scientific evidence regarding the 
benefits of wearing a respirator over a procedural 
mask when in contact with ‘medium-risk’ patients, we 
suspect that your recommendations are likely heavily 
influenced by the ‘precautionary principle’. However, 
the precautionary principle must be based on science 
and not obscure it. In addition, this precautionary 
principle could prove to be deleterious for all workers 
in Quebec if the risks associated with your recom-
mendations are greater than the expected benefits. We 
therefore ask that the CNESST [Commission des Normes, 
de l’Equité, de la Santé et de la Sécurité du Travail (French: 
Committee on Standards, Equity, Health and Safety 
at Work; Canada)]
       carry out as soon as possible and publish a risk-benefit 
analysis of its recommendations. This analysis should 
include a forecast of the expected benefits including a 
quantification of the cases of infection prevented 
through these recommendations, as well as the number 
of RPAs that should be used to prevent infection in 
a worker (known as “Number needed to treat”). In 
addition, this analysis must include an estimate of the 
occupational injuries that will occur as a result of these 
recommendations. Prolonged wearing of the respirator 
is indeed associated with risks for workers (skin lesions, 
headaches, fatigue and increased risk of becoming 
infected, etc.).” (source C23, Table 1)
The phrasing of the letter strongly emphasises the potential harms 
of the N95 mask (including, allegedly, a worker becoming so 
fatigued that they become inadvertently infected) rather than 
its potential benefits (preventing infection and death). The 
extract also illustrates the authors’ appeal to the tools of evi-
dence-based medicine (such as the Number Needed to Treat 
metric48) and their irritation in the face of what they appear to 
perceive as a challenge to their legitimate scientific authority 
in the sub-field of infectious diseases.
Japan. In Japan, cases and deaths from Covid-19 were very 
low compared to the West but high compared to neighbouring 
countries like Taiwan49. The first documented case of Covid-19 
in Japan was on 15th January 2020. By mid-February, there 
was an active national containment strategy in place which 
included assiduous contact-tracing with the goal of identi-
fying, investigating, and quashing new clusters promptly50. 
Contact-tracing was both prospective (to identify onward trans-
mission) and – unusually – retrospective (to identify which 
past activities may have led to the person becoming infected). 
Japan’s approach also included lengthy quarantine periods (30 
days), strict border controls, voluntary restriction of activities 
(for example, reducing travel and eating out, and working from 
home if possible), masking in the workplace, and economic 
support for businesses.
In contrast with the confident announcements from WHO and 
Western governments that the virus was not airborne, the 
Japanese government did not make any firm statements about 
the mode of transmission in these early documents. Notably, 
however, on 9th March 2020, the Government of Japan (source 
D1, Table 151), with the personal backing of the Prime Minister, 
reported a careful analysis of several clusters across the coun-
try made possible through meticulous analysis of retrospec-
tive contact-tracing data. It introduced the ‘3Cs’ message (avoid 
closed spaces, crowded places, and close proximity), explicitly 
invoking the precautionary principle on the grounds that the 
virus could be airborne:
       6. What we ask of you
       The locations where mass infections were confirmed 
so far are places where the following three conditions 
were met simultaneously: (1) closed space with poor 
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ventilation, (2) crowded with many people and (3) con-
versations and vocalization in close proximity (within 
arm’s reach of one another). It is believed that more 
people were infected in such places. Therefore, we ask 
that you predict locations and settings where these three 
conditions could occur simultaneously and avoid them.
       We do not have enough scientific evidence yet on 
how significantly such actions can reduce the risk of 
spreading infection. However, since places with poor 
ventilation and crowded places are increasing infec-
tions, we ask that you take precautions even before scien-
tific evidence for clear standards is found.” (source D1, 
Table 151, page 2)
Central to Japan’s novel and successful strategy of retrospec-
tive contact tracing was a large cohort of highly-trained public 
health officers based in (or rapidly redeployed to) local pub-
lic health centres – an approach sometimes referred to as field 
epidemiology. Importantly, these officers had ongoing experi-
ence of dealing with other airborne infectious diseases in the 
community, notably tuberculosis (TB), for which aggressive 
retrospective contact tracing with a view to identifying and 
controlling clusters was already in place50.
Japan’s 3Cs message, which was designed to inform both national 
policy and public behaviour, was adopted into public-facing 
WHO advice on 13th October 2020 (source A13, Table 152), 
though the mismatch between this advice and continuing state-
ments elsewhere there was “no firm evidence” for airborne 
spread32 was not addressed. Retrospective contact tracing 
had been attempted in some Western settings (e.g., British 
Columbia) in the first wave of the pandemic but was not 
sustained or showcased in the same way as Japan, nor did 
analysis of case clusters persuade local public health officials 
of the airborne nature of the disease. 
The striking difference in how aerosol theory was received in 
Japan compared to our other case studies may be explained in 
part by an analysis of individual-level factors. For example, the 
personality and trajectory of the virologist who is credited 
with introducing Japan’s ‘3Cs’ approach to the pandemic back 
in March 2020 (source D6, Table 153) - which structured his 
own habitus – likely played a role. He is a medical doctor 
by training and spent many years working as a senior adviser 
for the WHO on communicable diseases. He led WHO South 
East Asia’s response to SARS in 2003, where he became known 
for promoting transparency and information-sharing. But this 
doctor took a novel approach to the COVID-19 pandemic. He 
worked with a professor of mathematics to analyse early 
clusters of cases both within Japan and on the Diamond Princess 
cruise ship. The discovery that—unlike with influenza—a tiny 
proportion of primary cases gave rise to around 80% of second-
ary cases led them to hypothesise that the airborne route of 
transmission was dominant and that the key to controlling the 
pandemic was controlling clusters53. A press article from 
November 2020 describes him thus:
       “X---, an unassuming and bespectacled 61-year-old, 
is at times hardly distinguishable from the average 
salaryman. A field epidemiologist by training, X--- cut 
his teeth working for Japan’s development agency in 
Zambia, and has spent most of his career as an aca-
demic, currently affiliated with Tohoku University. He’s 
far less well-known in his native country than other top 
infectious disease officials like Anthony Fauci in the 
U.S., and unlike Sweden’s Anders Tegnell, no one is 
tattooing his image on their bodies. But those who worked 
with X--- say his early sense of urgency, constantly 
badgering government officials to do more, was crucial 
to Japan’s response.” (source D653)
In contrast to many key public health actors in the West, then, 
this leading medical adviser in Japan kept a low public profile, 
decided that randomised controlled trial evidence and the 
assumptions of evidence-based medicine had little to contribute 
to the pressing questions around transmission, worked quickly 
and collaboratively with non-medical experts to produce a novel 
mathematically-informed hypothesis, embraced the precau-
tionary principle (that action should be taken before scientific 
evidence is definitive), ignored advice from the WHO, devel-
oped a simple and catchy ‘3Cs’ message, and operated quietly 
but effectively behind the scenes to bring political actors up to 
and including the Prime Minister on board.
This contrasts with his contemporaries in the West, whose 
vested interests in their own game and their decision to reject the 
contribution of heterodox scientists tied them firmly to contin-
gent paths. The Japanese adviser was able to enjoy interdisci-
plinary collaboration in a country which seems fairly open to 
interfield alignment and solidarity in relation to public health.
Results
Orthodoxy and heterodoxy
In this section we present the findings of a textual analysis of 
publications and statements from scientists relating to SARS-
CoV-2 transmission. In sum, despite an appearance of a shared 
doxa, the scientific field contains deep divisions with distinct 
orthodox and heterodox positions. The orthodox position, taken 
by infectious disease researchers (mostly doctors working in 
hospital environments and schooled in the traditions and values 
of evidence-based medicine), can be summarised as follows. 
First, viral particles in exhaled air can be divided more or less 
straightforwardly into droplets (five microns or larger in diam-
eter) or aerosols (below five microns); the former transmit the 
disease within two metres while the latter would account for 
any transmission (if it occurred) beyond two metres. Second, 
whilst the virus is clearly present in short-range respiratory 
droplets, lack of consistent identification of SARS-CoV-2 in air 
samples means there is no good evidence for the airborne theory 
of transmission. Third, the randomised controlled trial occu-
pies a special position in the ‘evidence hierarchy’; other study 
designs, especially case studies, laboratory studies, and animal 
studies are considered inherently lower quality. Fourth, the tech-
nique of systematic review, in which a highly structured, meth-
ods-focused and somewhat technocratic approach is taken to 
searching, data extraction and data synthesis, is the best way to 
combine and summarise studies. Fifth, policies should be 
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based on the findings of ‘high-quality’ research (i.e., system-
atic reviews, with an emphasis on methodologically ‘robust’ 
designs, especially randomised controlled trials) which directly 
addresses the policy question, not on theoretical speculation, 
‘low-quality’ studies, or indirect evidence. Finally, system-
atic reviews of randomised controlled trials have demonstrated 
the benefits of handwashing, surface cleansing, and (in some 
circumstances) masking of healthcare staff and sick patients 
but not of masking asymptomatic members of the public, open-
ing windows, or other kinds of ventilation, in respiratory 
disease prevention. In sum, this position upholds the droplet 
theory of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and supports prevention 
measures focused on handwashing, physical distancing (with 
two metres seen as a key cut-off level) and selective masking. 
It does not exclude the possibility of airborne transmission, 
but considers that further ‘high-quality’ studies are needed to 
strengthen the evidence base for policymaking6. The orthodox 
position says little about the precautionary principle and does 
not actively embrace it.
The heterodox position, taken by aerosol researchers (mostly 
laboratory-based engineers and chemists who study the behav-
iour of particles suspended in the atmosphere), is as follows. 
First, aerosols are extremely complex; they vary considerably 
in size (up to 100 microns) and their flow follows turbulent, 
not linear, dynamics. Second, whilst aerosols account for 
all disease transmission beyond two metres, they transmit 
predominantly at close range (within one metre), hence close 
transmission cannot be attributed solely (or even predomi-
nantly) to droplets. Third, the evidence for aerosol transmission 
of SARS-CoV-2 is strong and comes from many different kinds 
of study, notably detailed analysis of ‘super-spreader’ events 
where dozens of individuals became infected from one or a 
small number of index cases, as well as laboratory studies includ-
ing animal experiments. Fourth, policies can and should be based 
on a rich narrative synthesis of heterogeneous evidence, not 
solely (or even at all) on randomized controlled trials. Finally, 
given the dire implications of misplaced reassurance, a pre-
cautionary approach (changing policy when evidence suggests 
aerosol transmission, even if it falls short of scientific proof) 
may be justified. In sum, this position upholds a predominantly 
airborne mode of transmission and supports prevention meas-
ures focused on public masking and reducing ‘shared air’ (by 
avoiding crowding and increasing ventilation), in addition to 
handwashing and surface cleansing.
There is an uneven relationship of power and status between 
these orthodox and heterodox positions. The orthodoxy described 
above is considered and upheld as the prototypical science 
mainly within the field of medicine and to the extent that 
medical experts operate in a uni-disciplinary way and eschew 
cross-disciplinary collaborations—see for example the WHO’s 
Scientific Brief on Transmission of SARS-CoV-2, (source A11, 
Table 132 and outputs published as highly-regarded Cochrane 
Reviews54,55. The heterodox perspective is considered legitimate 
among scientists more generally outside the field of medicine. 
The leading science journal, Nature, for example, has published 
numerous papers demonstrating airborne transmission of the 
virus – see for example some landmark animal studies56,57, 
an overview of superspreading events58, and several editorials 
arguing for a paradigm shift from droplet and fomite to aerosol 
transmission31,59,60. Another leading scientific journal, Science, 
has published empirical studies of transmission dynamics 
which support the airborne hypothesis61,62, a highly-cited short 
commentary4, and a comprehensive narrative review63. Occa-
sional cross-fertilisation in academic journals is illustrated, for 
example, by the work of Bourouiba, an aerosol scientist whose 
papers generally appear in journals such as Annual Review 
of Fluid Mechanics64 but who has successfully published in 
leading medical journals such as JAMA65. Within the medi-
cal sub-field, clinical authors occasionally align with the het-
erodoxy – for example, in the journal Anaesthesia where there 
is much interest in the question of whether AGMPs are the only 
situations where higher-grade protection is needed66. 
Importantly, however, the heterodoxy remains largely an out-
sider within the hegemonic structures of medical science, 
and, in that context, it requires active recognition and support 
if it is to serve as a source of innovation from the margins. Sci-
entists can publish research supporting the orthodox and het-
erodox positions, but academic debate appears to be largely a 
double monologue with both sides strengthening their 
own position but failing to convince—or even attempt to 
convince—the other sub-field. Public heath administrations, 
the de facto implementation channel for scientific findings in 
this context, have the power to arbitrate the scientific divide 
and select a preferred version of the truth. As Weiss showed, 
evidence use by policymakers is mostly strategic—that is, 
used selectively to justify a chosen position rather than dispas-
sionately to inform it 67. As part of the State apparatus, public 
health administrations can use the State monopoly of symbolic 
violence to push what they uphold as truth (for example, in the 
media, in institutional guidance, and in lockdown policies). 
The premature decision of key public health bodies to favour 
a droplet over aerosol mode of transmission instead of letting 
scientific debates run their course had far-reaching negative 
consequences.
Scientific capital and illusio
The two scientific sub-fields on which we focus have 
differently valued forms of scientific capital. Broadly speaking, 
in the West the scientific capitals of infectious disease scientists 
are symbolically valued and promoted as robust and relevant 
evidence, whereas the scientific capitals of aerosol scientists, 
who occupy a heterodox position, are framed as weak, soft, or 
limited. These framings present uneven power relations. Our 
data also powerfully illustrate the role of illusio (ie., the belief 
of players that the game they play is worthy of playing) in the 
unfolding of national and international infection control policy68. 
Illusio is the allure of a game, which on the one hand draws in 
and keeps the players who find it worthy to be in a game, and 
on the other strips them of developing a healthy and critical 
view of the processes and outcomes of the game. By join-
ing its routines and activities, individuals start accepting the 
rules of the game in a particular field as natural and objective, 
even when the game that they play may be to their own 
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detriment or harmful to others. An epistemic break from the 
illusio is hard to achieve from within the game because the rules 
of the game appear innocuous to the players, who either join 
the game knowing them or come to accept them over time.
In the case of WHO, and those of the UK and Canada, the sci-
entific capital of infectious disease scientists was recognised 
and valued above and beyond that of aerosol scientists. On the 
basis of the dataset we analysed, the former appears to have a 
particularly strong belief in the worthiness of their game. For 
example, a press article on the controversy around airborne 
spread in July 2020 (source A9) quotes a member of the WHO 
IPCRDEG-C19:
       “It is a shame that they [the 238 scientists who wrote 
the open letter] felt the need to publish,’ X---, a pro-
fessor at the University of East Anglia in the United 
Kingdom and a member of WHO’s infection preven-
tion committee, told Live Science. ‘Given the ample 
evidence that reducing droplet transmission works 
[to reduce COVID-19 spread], throwing other things 
into the mix only confuses people and undermines the 
World Health Organization at a critical time,’ X--- said. 
[…] ‘Most of them are chemists, engineers, owners 
of ventilation companies,’ X--- said. ‘They do not have 
a broad understanding of disease transmission mech-
anisms … this issue is more nuanced than many of 
them realize.” (source A9, Table 130)
Another article, published in Nature at around the same 
time (source A10, Table 1), quotes the lead for the WHO 
Secretariat for the IPCRDEG-C19:
       “There is this movement, which made their voice very 
loud by publishing various position papers or opinion 
papers,’ [Y---] says. ‘Why don’t we ask ourselves … 
why are these theories coming mainly from engineers, 
aerobiologists, and so on, whereas the majority of 
the clinical, infectious-disease, epidemiology, public-
health, and infection-prevention and control people 
do not think exactly the same?”31
In both the above extracts, members of the IPCRDEG-C19 
illustrate a number of elements of illusio: a shared sense of 
the rules of the game, depiction of the orthodox position as 
well-established truth arrived at through rigorous, ‘proper’ 
medical science (and as the benchmark against which all other 
science is measured), rejection of the heterodox position as 
flawed and based on weak science, and the view that adher-
ents to the heterodoxy lack understanding of the topic, ignore 
well-established facts, and sow confusion by casting doubt 
on the orthodoxy. Indeed, the illusio appears to underpin the 
symbolic violence of the message that adherents to the hetero-
doxy are not entitled to voice their views because this threatens 
the stability of the orthodoxy. These excerpts also suggest a 
closing of rank among committee members, possibly reflect-
ing features of the medical sub-field which—arguably—hosts 
a habitus of elite and exclusive rites of passage and dispositions 
among its members.
In a more recent example from our dataset, in a high-profile 
panel discussion broadcast live from a Canadian university 
in April 2021 (source A21, Table 1), the Chair of the WHO 
IPCRDEG-C19 warns his audience to “be careful” when 
evaluating the large amount of weak, non-peer-reviewed 
science on the topic of SARS-CoV-2 transmission (timed at 28.00 
in the recording); he cites a flawed modelling study purporting 
to demonstrate airborne transmission that was later withdrawn 
(28:52). He reminds his audience that science needs to fol-
low “basic epidemiological principles” (29:48) and that “this is 
fundamental infectious diseases epidemiology” (29:55) (empha-
sis added). Later in his talk (40:13), he challenges aerosol 
scientists’ claim that the virus is difficult to culture from the 
air (he describes it as a “[r]elatively easy virus to culture and 
is everywhere in the environment”) and emphasises how his 
own team have cultured the virus repeatedly from droplets. 
There are, he states “very few studies of high quality” 
published by aerosol scientists (45:10). While acknowledging the 
likelihood of what he calls “situational” airborne transmission 
(by which he appears to mean rare spread when an unusual 
combination of environmental conditions are found), his 
conclusion is “I would like to see a much higher level of scientific 
evidence, including some basic science” (56:10) before policy 
changes.
Thus, the chair of the WHO committee charged with writing 
international guidance on SARS-CoV-2 transmission anchors 
his arguments firmly in the orthodoxy of his own medical 
sub-field. He depicts the relatively sparse and inconsistent 
evidence base from air sampling studies of SARS-CoV-2 as 
due to poor scientific technique and ignoring “basic” scientific 
principles. Crucially for someone in a position of international 
policy influence, he sees no need for policy to change.
Symbolic violence—the exertion of power by the ortho-
doxy to impose its own norms on less powerful groups—is on 
display in the confident statements made by its adherents (see 
also C23, Table 1). But the practices and discourses of symbolic 
devaluation are also produced and reproduced in a more subtle 
way by those whose work is symbolically violated, as they—to 
a greater or lesser extent—accept or acquiesce to their lowly 
stakes in the game. Notwithstanding the important example of 
the open letter to policymakers from aerosol scientists (source 
A8, Table 13), protests from aerosol scientists during the 
pandemic have been relatively few. It would appear that at least 
some aerosol scientists have remained silent, accepting the 
way their evidence is relegated to secondary status through 
subtle and overt mechanisms of devaluation.
Our Japanese case provides an interesting contrast. From the 
outset, Japan accepted an airborne mode of transmission and 
its government acknowledged and highlighted research by aero-
sol scientists at leading Japanese universities69, allowing their 
scientific capital to be recognised. Of course, aerosol scien-
tists existed in the West, and indeed outnumbered those from 
the East in the open letter to policymakers and aimed at the 
WHO3. What appears to be missing from the Japanese case is a 
powerful counter-lobby of infectious disease scientists, aligned 
strongly with droplet theory and the evidence-based medicine 
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movement, whose modus operandi was to focus predominantly 
on the findings of randomised controlled trials and warn policy-
makers against taking action until such so-called ‘high-quality’ 
evidence was available. This case, and parallel cases elsewhere 
in the far East, may partly reflect historical differences such 
as the relatively recent experiences with SARS (2001) and 
MERS (2012). But it may also reflect a greater openness within 
the scientific field to multiple disciplines and sub-fields bringing 
their expertise together to address a crisis. This in turn may be 
because, for various reasons, the sub-field of evidence-based 
medicine with its formal hierarchies of evidence and its close 
links to top-down, standardised approaches to health policy70,71 
never became orthodoxy in Japan72. 
It is also worth noting how, in Japan, teasing out the detail 
of local clusters of COVID-19 led to abductive reasoning of 
the format “what could have caused this?” and immediate 
mobilisation of the precautionary principle for a national 3Cs 
policy before the science of airborne transmission was confirmed. 
This contrasts markedly with the more superficial approach 
to cluster analysis taken by most Western countries which 
appeared to presuppose a droplet mode of transmission. The US 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for example, pub-
lished a weekly report in May 2020 describing a large outbreak 
of Covid-19 following a choir practice and commenting – 
prematurely – that “choir practice attendees had multiple 
opportunities for droplet transmission from close contact or fomite 
transmission”73. The outbreak was later shown, through metic-
ulous analysis of interpersonal interactions and who exactly 
touched which shared objects such as chairs and food plates, to 
be due to inhalation of airborne virus74.
Despite Japan’s markedly different approach in which aero-
sol science was considered legitimate evidence for informing 
the pandemic response from as early as February 2020, its ‘3Cs’ 
message was adopted only belatedly by the WHO and given 
limited emphasis (source A13, Table 1). This begs the ques-
tion: when scientific orthodoxy differs across countries and 
regions, whose orthodoxy will gain a hegemonic hold in the 
international public health space, and why?
Intersecting fields
Our case study of the droplet (orthodoxy) versus aerosol 
(heterodoxy) stand-off, exemplified at international level by the 
WHO’s stalling and at national level by various local, regional, 
and national conflicts over worker protection, illustrates the 
intersection of the three key fields – political, state (policy and 
regulatory) and scientific – introduced in our theoretical section 
above.
Politically, when the droplet theory was embraced in the WHO 
Director-General’s emphatic self-correction75, it distanced the 
WHO from the “military word” (that is, linked to bioterror-
ism and hence with major political overtones and implications 
far beyond health) and brought the new disease into a less overtly 
political and more narrowly health-focused semantic space. It 
also provided an apparently robust scientific rationale for the 
potentially politically sensitive decision to provide only lower- 
grade protection for most healthcare workers at a time when 
global supply chains for higher-grade PPE were perilously 
inadequate26.
Alignment between the WHO’s espoused scientific position 
and the State (bureaucratic public health) field in different coun-
tries was achieved largely through the production of position 
statements, scientific briefings, and guidelines, underpinned 
by systematic reviews of evidence, often in the form of what 
is known as ‘living’ reviews (that is, periodically updated to 
incorporate new evidence)—though as our empirical data 
illustrate, such documents rarely employ new thinking. How 
such guidance documents were produced is described in the 
following quote from a WHO press conference on 5th June 
2020, in which the lead for the WHO’s Secretariat responds to a 
journalist’s question:
       “our process of developing guidance is based on … all 
the existing evidence and then through a process of con-
sultation of international experts from different countries 
and different disciplines. Of course this topic is dealt 
with mainly by infection prevention and control, 
infectious diseases and epidemiology specialists. Many 
of these people actually are health workers who take 
care of COVID-19 patients so we consulted these 
experts and evaluated a variety of evidence; first of all 
the evidence about the modes of transmission of this 
virus, which so far have been demonstrated for droplet 
and contact.[..]
       The second element of the evidence is the evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the face protections and there 
are randomised control trials which are the best type 
of evidence we can wish that demonstrate no differ-
ence in effectiveness in preventing transmission of 
influenza or other respiratory viruses. Eventually there 
is also some emerging evidence from observational stud-
ies which unfortunately have a lower level of evidence 
[…].” (source A7, Table 1, emphasis added76)
In this response, the WHO representative firmly locates 
relevant expertise in the medical orthodoxy of infectious dis-
ease science. Indeed, it was because the experts were directly 
involved in patient care (i.e., were doctors) that their exper-
tise was privileged in the production of WHO advice. In stat-
ing that “all the existing evidence”74 had been considered and 
uncritically endorsing evidence-based medicine’s methodo-
logical hierarchy with its privileging of randomised controlled 
trials (see also sources A20 and C23, Table 1), she appears to 
designate the work of aerosol scientists as either not evidence at 
all or as inherently poor-quality. Having dismissed this het-
erodox evidence, and drawing only on medical orthodoxy, she 
concludes that the evidence base for droplet transmission is 
well-established whereas that for aerosol transmission (beyond 
AGMPs) is weak or absent. Thus the state field aligns strongly 
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with medical scientific orthodoxy and systematically excludes 
heterodoxy while appearing to include “a variety of evidence”74.
A similar orthodoxy-driven alignment between political, 
state, and scientific fields is evident in our national case stud-
ies from the UK and Canada. In the UK case, for example, 
the WHO’s early—incorrect—statements emphasising 
droplet infection were set in stone in very first draft of an 
influential national guideline; subsequent updates just added 
detail (and hundreds of references) but did not question the fun-
damental model of transmission or the precautions based on 
them42. The aerosol scientists’ heterodoxy had so little cred-
ibility that their protests to the WHO could be described using 
trivialising language as “a tempest in a teacup” by local public 
health officials in Canada (source C3, Table 145). Japan’s strong 
alignment with aerosol heterodoxy, including its early mobi-
lisation of the precautionary principle (source D1), from the 
outset provides striking contrast here.
The push-back against medical scientific orthodoxy in the 
West came from relatively low-status staff such as non-medical 
healthcare workers, classroom teachers, and shop-floor workers 
whose training encourages them to provide a quality, hands-on 
service to the patient, pupil, or customer. These workers had 
begun to suspect that they were at risk of an occupational 
disease because they had seen colleagues succumb, but who had 
little individual control over their working conditions or envi-
ronment. The response of the state was overtly political – for 
example in the individualization and financialization of respon-
sibility and advice to workers to “use their professional 
judgement” (using the illusio of professional choice) and pur-
chase their own higher-grade PPE if they felt it was needed since 
there was ‘no evidence to support a change [in policy]’. The 
involvement of workers’ unions and resort to the courts to 
push the responsibility back on employers brings in the legal 
sub-field, whose dismissal of droplet orthodoxy in one case is 
swift and emphatic, highlighting how medical orthodoxy does 
not always survive the test of rigour in other fields.
Symbolic violence also emerged at the interplay of social and 
state policy subfield in the shape of various infection control 
rituals introduced in the early months of the pandemic. Whilst 
the introduction of hand sanitisers, masking and physical 
distancing measures in public places was a plausible response 
(all were probably based on a droplet theory of transmission, 
though the latter two would also reduce aerosol transmission), 
other measures seemed heavy-handed and misaligned with 
evidence. Closure of parks, beaches, open-space exercise 
areas, and children’s playgrounds as possible hotspots of infec-
tion, for example, occurred in both Canada and the UK. Such 
measures over-emphasise the risk of droplet infection (e.g., 
through contaminated equipment) and ignore the vastly reduced 
risk of transmission outdoors (since aerosols are quickly dis-
persed) compared to indoors77; they appear to represent a highly 
symbolic move in which safe and familiar local places and 
spaces traditionally associated with health and refreshment 
come to be redefined by the state, who claim to be ‘following 
the science’, as dirty and unsafe. In the same way, screwing class-
room windows shut in schools in our Canadian case study (source 
C11, Table 1) is an example of symbolic violence manifested 
in hegemonic inter-field struggles (since such a measure 
does not conflict with a droplet theory of transmission but is 
dramatically misaligned with aerosol transmission).
The dominant discourse of medical scientific orthodoxy, 
once it finds allies in economic ideology and political con-
cerns such as limited resources for preventative measures and 
PPE could potentially become an instrument of symbolic vio-
lence to taint, trivialise, denigrate, and ultimately control 
professional and individual choice in other fields (for example, 
in the private sector where employers claim they are follow-
ing evidence-based hygiene practices by installing hand sanitis-
ers but refuse to impose mask mandates or invest in expensive 
ventilation or air filtration measures to protect employees and 
customers78).
Emerging challenges to orthodoxy
Whilst the message from aerosol scientists that transmis-
sion of SARS-CoV-2 is predominantly airborne was ignored 
and dismissed within the medical and health policy main-
stream during 2020, the heterodoxy did not die. On the contrary, 
by spring 2021 the dominance of airborne transmission was 
becoming more accepted even within medical circles – for 
example, in January 2021 the Journal of Hospital Infection 
published a paper entitled ‘Dismantling myths on the airborne 
transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavi-
rus-2 (SARS-CoV-2)’79, and in April 2021, the British Medical 
Journal commissioned an editorial from an overlapping team 
entitled ‘Covid-19 has redefined airborne transmission’75, the 
Lancet published ‘Ten scientific reasons in support of air-
borne transmission of SARS-CoV-2’2 and the Journal of the 
American Medical Association published a review article on 
ventilation and filtration80. Whilst the WHO remained resist-
ant to the phrase ‘airborne transmission’, it placed increasing 
emphasis on ventilation in late 2020 and into 2021 (source A17, 
Table 138).
It is worth examining the authorship and presentation style of 
papers supportive of aerosol spread which were published in 
mainstream medical journals. For example, Professor Tang, the 
lead author on two papers cited in the previous paragraph75,79, 
is a medical doctor (virologist) but has a track record of work-
ing on interdisciplinary studies with laboratory scientists. He 
was already working on airborne transmission of respiratory 
infections, as illustrated by a 2019 paper81 on chickenpox, mea-
sles, tuberculosis, influenza, and smallpox– all diseases which 
have been shown to be airborne (some after a long delay). 
Another doctor on the ‘Dismantling myths’ paper, Raymond 
Tellier, gained an undergraduate degree in mathematics and 
a MSc in physics before going on to become a professor of 
infectious diseases.
Rather than simply setting out the aerosol science arguments, 
Tang and his co-authors engage in an effort to persuade. They 
Page 14 of 32
Wellcome Open Research 2021, 6:126 Last updated: 12 NOV 2021
construct their review paper around what they depict rhetori-
cally as “myths” – namely, elements of the medical orthodoxy 
described above5. They begin by acknowledging the assump-
tions of the orthodox scientists, but then explain why those 
assumptions are flawed. In their editorial, in relation to a key 
terminological confusion around words like ‘droplet nuclei’ 
(a term used by droplet scientists to depict exhaled droplets 
which have evaporated down to five microns or smaller, are 
suspended in the air, may persist, and travel long distances, but 
still—in their terminology—merit the name ‘droplet’), they state:
       “The confusion has emanated from traditional termi-
nology introduced during the last century. This created 
poorly defined divisions between “droplet,” “airborne,” 
and “droplet nuclei” transmission, leading to mis-
understandings over the physical behaviour of these 
particles. Essentially, if you can inhale particles— 
regardless of their size or name—you are breathing 
in aerosols. Although this can happen at long range, 
it is more likely when close to someone, as the aero-
sols between two people are much more concentrated 
at short range, rather like being close to someone who 
is smoking.” (page 913)79
In sum, papers written by interdisciplinary groups and includ-
ing medically-qualified individuals with experience in other 
sub-fields have begun to systematically challenge the ortho-
doxy from within its own sub-field. Such publications, however, 
remain sparse at the time of writing.
Discussion
In this paper, we have used the detailed analysis of local, national, 
and international case studies to show how, through repetition 
of a hierarchically-constructed scientific game, a hegemonic 
order emerged between the orthodox position taken by clinically-
qualified infectious disease scientists in the West who aligned 
with the evidence-based medicine movement and supported a 
predominantly droplet mode of transmission for SARS-CoV-2, 
and the heterodox position taken by aerosol scientists sup-
porting a predominantly airborne mode, to the exclusion and 
dismissal of the latter group and their evidence. The illusio in 
this case was upheld with the hegemonic structures of state 
regulators who held on to a limited range of evidence that called 
for less costly measures, and international agencies such as 
WHO, whose committees and decision-making groups on this 
particular topic showed a high degree of internal agreement and 
lacked interdisciplinarity in their expertise and methodologies. 
The proximity (in training and organizational position) between 
medical science and State public health ensured that the de facto 
arbiters of truth strongly favoured the orthodox narrative.
We have shown how the nature of the scientific game benefited 
the orthodox scientists, enhanced their status and depicted the 
heterodox scientists’ claims as vocal but incorrect or irrelevant. 
However, the mounting evidence in support of a dominant 
airborne route of transmission has begun to produce a grad-
ual shift, whereby the illusio that the orthodoxy created is 
increasingly contested. Through consistent claims of legiti-
macy and recognition, aerosol science has managed to encroach 
on the orthodox position internationally. But this has happened 
only to a limited degree and at a pace that is quite unsuited to 
an urgent pandemic response. The partial and gradual nature 
of the change, and the persistence around the world of policies 
underpinned by flawed droplet science, begs the question 
of what could be garnered as lessons from this experience. 
We posit that there is need to improve the mechanisms by which 
multiple disciplines gain legitimate access to be considered 
as evidence by regulatory and advisory organisations, and 
also to improve the measures of accountability by which 
such organisations judge themselves and are judged by others.
According to Bourdieu, fields and subfields have their own 
ontology, their particular ways of knowing and affective 
engagement with knowledge82. Bourdieu explained how such 
inter-field relations operated between fields of science and soci-
ety: “Strictly scientific authority tends to convert itself, over 
time, into a social authority capable of opposing the assertion 
of a new scientific authority. Further, social authority within 
the scientific field tends to become legitimized by presenting 
itself as pure technical reason, and also the recognized signs of 
statutory authority modify the social perception of strictly techni-
cal abilities”14, page 7). Nowhere is this principle more evident 
than in the appropriation of terms such as ‘rigorous’, ‘robust’, 
and ‘evidence-based’ by the medical orthodoxy to define its 
own assumptions and interpretations as unassailable.
In order for fields and subfields to respect, recognise, and 
value knowledge in other fields or subfields they need to have 
ontologies that are pluralist. Such pluralism is often advocated 
under the banner of transdisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, 
which are widely advocated in science but often fail to occur. 
Indeed, in relation to the living guideline on COVID-19, the 
World Health Organisation presents its ’Guideline Development 
Group (GDG) comprising individuals with broad expertise span-
ning multiple specialties’ (source A16, Table 139), its descrip-
tion of the guideline development process for COVID-19 is 
firmly locked to epidemiological assumptions (e.g., it recom-
mends that research questions be framed as “PICO”—population- 
intervention-comparison-outcome—and uses a hierarchy of 
evidence in which randomised controlled trials sit above 
laboratory and case studies)83.
Dominance of this exceptionally narrow ontology both within 
the WHO and also at the level of state regulators led to siloed 
and purist approaches by which the heterodox position (based 
on quite different kinds of research question and study designs) 
was trivialised, undermined, and systematically disregarded. 
Bourdieu hinted at an explanation for this uneven relation-
ship: “[t]he dominant agents are those who have the power to 
impose that definition of science according to which the most 
accomplished science consists of having, being, and doing what 
they themselves have, are, and do” (page 1414). Whilst we 
acknowledge that practical issues—notably the global shortage 
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of personal protective equipment mentioned above26—also had 
a role to play,  such influences did not explain why positions 
became even more entrenched when these shortages subsided.
The arbitration processes between state regulators and the sci-
entific community that led to firmly-held, state-sanctioned 
positions on matters such as modes of transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 or effective preventative measures cannot be 
understood if we conceptualize them as taking place entirely 
within the field of science. Whilst symbolic struggles within 
science can be understood on one level as Kuhnian paradigm 
struggles in which old theories and methods are increasingly 
unable to explain new observations and are therefore replaced84, 
there is also a more political dimension about which Kuhn 
had little to say but which Bourdieu viewed as central. Domi-
nant agents in the scientific field (doctors and epidemiologists) 
may have continued to defend the old paradigm long after evi-
dence emerged to challenge it because their own power and 
status was linked to their involvement in the orthodoxy. Emerg-
ing agents from heterodox fields (chemists, ventilation flow 
modelers and engineers) found it difficult to challenge orthodox 
position on the legitimacy of methods and disciplinary 
contributions because they lacked power.
We believe that the COVID-19 crisis profoundly realigned the 
interdependence and relative autonomy of the three fields at 
the core of the response. Highly technical scientific debates 
regarding the transmissibility of coronaviruses—debates 
about which nobody but a handful of specialists would have 
had an interest in normal times—quickly became the point of 
intersection of science, politics, and policy. Dominant 
agents from the political field held daily press conferences 
to present and defend national COVID-19 prevention strate-
gies and public health orders that directly influenced the daily 
lives of billions—and which in turn hinged on underlying theo-
ries about the assumed mode of transmission of SARS-CoV-2. 
In this context, the arbitration between competing doxas could 
not be left to its fate within the field of science. It became a mat-
ter of (political) life and death to agents in the political field as 
well as a central issue structuring political games, and the very 
raison d’être of organisations in the subfield of public health.
During 2020, political agents and public health structures in 
the West who were forced to make tough decisions invariably 
opted for the questionable orthodoxy of droplet-based trans-
mission. We question whether the reluctance from those 
agents to consider airborne transmission—or even to take the 
precautionary principle into account—may be too systematic 
and too persistent to be explicable by the nature of the scientific 
evidence alone. A reviewer of a previous draft of this paper 
raised an important point:
  “Although infection control specialists may have been 
misinformed, they considered their views to be evi-
dence-based. They did not reject heterodox views to 
defend the primacy of their field and defend their 
‘scientific capital,’ but rather because they believed 
their knowledge to be superior and interpreted their 
observations in the light of an anachronistic paradigm.” 
[reviewer 1]
To clarify, both Bourdieusian and a Kuhnian analyses assume, 
broadly speaking, that beliefs within a scientific orthodoxy are 
honestly held—precisely because they align with prevailing 
mental models. However, it is also the case that when a mental 
model is associated with a high degree of scientific capi-
tal (that is, when it is associated with power and prestige 
for the individual or group), the honest scientist will be less 
inclined to consider changing it. Such is the nature of illusio 
in many fields of science, the allure of the scientific game and 
the way the powerful players play it with great success over 
time prevents the players from developing a healthy view of 
the game once they are heavily vested and entrenched 
in it.
Our dataset contains several examples—such as the WHO’s 
reluctance to use the ‘military word’, and the declaration 
from both Scottish and Quebec officials that there was ‘no 
evidence’ to support a change to high-grade PPE for health-
care workers—consistent with subtle influence of political fac-
tors. In all these examples, refusal to adopt the precautionary 
principle was striking. Although the rationality of this politi-
cal process could be questioned from a purely scientific per-
spective, it makes sense given the competing nature of priorities 
(financial, geopolitical, and practical).
Interdisciplinarity is an espoused practice in scholarship, yet, 
its operationalisation in terms of understanding reality often 
remains unattended85. In this paper we suggest that embrac-
ing and protecting interdisciplinarity may be a key way to 
transcend fruitless struggles for power among subfields of 
science, politics, and medical practice. Ironically, interdisci-
plinarity is differently defined by different disciplines. More 
positivistic disciplines tend to view it in terms of collaboration— 
the combining of particular skills and knowledge bases to 
address a large and complex research challenge (as in com-
putational genomics, for example). Following Rowland86, we 
prefer to define interdisciplinarity as contestation—in which 
the meetings between disciplines lead to fundamental clashes 
(for example about the nature of reality or about preferred 
ways of knowing that reality) and inevitable conflicts. This lat-
ter kind of interdisciplinarity could either have virtuous (e.g., 
generation of new knowledge and insights) or vicious (e.g., pur-
suit of status and privilege) outcomes. In order to generate vir-
tuous outcomes from interdisciplinary contestation, a better 
process of scientific governance is needed in key decision- 
making bodies as well as in design and delivery of research 
works.
Albert et al.87 have suggested that in the context of academia, 
inclusive work practices could help interdisciplinarity to 
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flourish between social sciences, humanities, and medicine. 
We believe that, in addition, radical changes are needed to 
governance in the key advisory bodies within which scien-
tific topics are scoped, advice is commissioned, and findings 
assimilated and actioned. Rejection or under-emphasis of 
the airborne hypothesis for so long by bodies whose advice 
impacted on the lives of billions was, we believe, not merely a 
failure of the scientific process but a failure of the governance 
of that process. Effective governance requires not merely struc-
tures, processes, and technical procedures (which, as currently 
set up, assume that science sits separately from politics) but 
measures which recognise that science is politically entangled 
and therefore provide opportunities for actors to deliberate 
collectively and harness their differences and conflicts 
productively88,89. Rather than assigning power to a ‘closed shop’ 
of experts in a single scientific sub-field, thereby aligning 
with what Nowotny et al.90 have called ‘Mode 1 knowledge 
translation’—defined as hegemonic, hierarchical, unidisciplinary 
and with a unidirectional flow of knowledge from science to 
policy—we exhort the WHO and other public health bodies 
to embrace what Nowotny et al. call ‘Mode 2 knowledge 
production’—an approach to science which is more socially dis-
tributed, more application-oriented, inherently trans-disciplinary, 
and subject to multiple accountabilities. In this second 
mode, a much wider range of stakeholders, including not just 
other scientists but also front-line workers and the lay public, 
would be involved in defining the questions for which different 
kinds of science might begin to provide answers. How such a 
model would play out in practice is the subject for another 
paper.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the hegemonic grip of prevailing infection con-
trol discourse remains strong. We believe that exit from the 
pandemic depends on science and policy finding a way to 
renegotiate what Bourdieu called the ‘rules of the scientific 
game’ – what counts as evidence, quality, and rigour in pluralist 
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B2. Antimicrobial Resistance and Healthcare Associated Infection (ARHAI) rapid review on 
COVID-19 (v 11, updated 5th Feb 2021)42 
B3. Open letter to UK Prime Minister (led by Royal College of Nursing) on protecting 
healthcare workers (19th Feb 2021)40 
B4. Independent evidence review of guidelines for infection prevention and control in 
UK hospitals by Gould and Purssell, commissioned by Royal College of Nursing (28th Feb 
2021)43 
B5. Radio interview Good Morning Scotland (2nd Mar 2021) (transcript available from 
authors) 
B6. Public Health England guidance on ventilation of indoor spaces (5th Mar 2021)44 
B7. Blog by Professor Alison Leary ‘Why does healthcare reject the precautionary principle?’93
Canada Ventilation and 
masks in schools 
(British Colombia) 
and staff protection 
in healthcare 
settings (Quebec)
C1. Tweet from British Colombia Centre for Disease Control @CDCofBC (11th Feb 2020)  
“this is not an airborne virus”. 
C2. News report by Kotyk ‘“Absolutely no evidence” that COVID is airborne’ (1st June 2020) 
C3. News report by Lindsay ‘Controversy over airborne transmission of Covid-19’ (20th July 
2020) 
C4. British Colombia Teachers’ Federation news release ‘BCTF files application with the 
Labour Relations Board over COVID-19 health and safety concerns’ (18th September 2020) 
C5. British Colombia Teachers’ Federation. Brief for the Minister of Education, the 
Honourable Jennifer Whiteside. (17th Dec 2020)94 
C6. British Colombia Centre for Disease Control: How it [COVID-19] spreads (5th Jan 2021)46 
C7. British Colombia Nurses’ Union web report ‘BCCDC Now Recognizes Airborne 
Transmission of COVID-19’ (8th Jan 2021) 
C8. British Colombia Centre for Disease Control: ‘Personal Protective Equipment’ (27th Jan 
2021)95 
C9. British Colombia Centre for Disease Control: ‘COVID-19 Public Health Guidance for K-12 
Schools’ (4th Feb 2021)10 
C10. British Colombia Teachers’ Federation news release ‘Changes to K–12 COVID-19 
guidelines include some important positive steps, but more can be done’ (4th Feb 2021) 
C11. News report by Brend ‘School officials order windows screwed shut’ (20th Feb 2021) 
C12. News report by Migdal ‘4 Takeaways from Dr Bonnie Henry’s New Book’ (12th March 
2021). 
C13. News report by Radio-Canada ‘Le personnel médical en CHSLD veut davantage de 
protection’ (20th Apr 2020) 
C14. Lafrenière, M. Le CIUSSS et le lavage des mains: «extrêmement petit de la part de la 
direction». newspaper article in Le Nouvelliste. (2020, Mardi 28th April 2020). 
C15. News report by Radio Canada (14th May 2020) Tous les résidents du CHSLD Vigi Mont-
Royal ont contracté le virus.
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Setting Focus Sources analysed for this case (listed in date order)
C16. Paré, I. Hécatombe chez les travailleurs de la santé. newspaper article in Le Devoir. 
(15th May 2020). 
C17. Public Health Ordonance : Arruda, H. (8th June 2020). Ordonnance du directeur national 
de santé publique concernant le port des équipements de protection respiratoires et oculaires. 
Québec: Ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux du Québec. 
C18. News report by La Presse canadienne (10th July 2020). https://ici.radio-canada.ca/
nouvelle/1718984/restriction-masque-n95-covid-coronavirus-cour-contestation 
C19. Paré, I. newspaper article in Le Devoir. (13th July 2020). Les infirmières contestent en 
cour le recours «abusif» à l’arrêté dictant leurs conditions de travail 
C20. Paré, I. newspaper article in Le Devoir (16th October 2020). Québec n’aura plus besoin 
de rationner les masques N95.
C21. News report by M. Meloche-Holubowski (16th February 2021) https://ici.radio-canada.
ca/nouvelle/1768418/10000-morts-deces-covid-quebec-pandemie-covid-coronavirus 
C22. Legal judgement from Quebec court adjudicating between nurses’ unions and Public 
Health Institute of Quebec. (23rd Mar 2021) 
C23. News report by Radio Canada (15th April 2021) La CNESST invitée à revoir sa position 




of ‘3Cs’ public 
information 
campaign
D1. Report from national expert meeting of Novel Coronavirus Control Team (Office of 
Japanese Prime Minister, 9th March 2020)51 
D2. ‘3Cs’ policy information poster (28th March 2020)96 
D3. Speech by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (7th April 2020)97 
D4. Covid-19 update from Government of Japan (7th April 2020)98 
D5. Academic paper on COVID-19 in Japan by Shimizu and Nigita (23rd Oct 2020)49 
D6. Press article by Du ‘This virus expert saved Japan from the worst of COVID-19. But has 
the magic worn off?’ (20th November 2020)53 
D7. Academic paper on Japan’s public health centers by Imamura et al. (18th Dec 2020)50
Data availability
All data underlying the results are available as part of the 
article in Table 1 and no additional source data are 
required.
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Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited.
Florence Villesèche   
Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark 
The authors replied to the comments thoroughly, clearly indicating where they agreed and 
disagreed, and how this led them to clarify or modify the text.  
 
I am thus satisfied with the changes and have no further comments to make.
 
Competing Interests: No competing interests were disclosed.
Reviewer Expertise: Diversity, identity, networks, organisational sociology
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of 
expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
Version 1
Reviewer Report 07 July 2021
https://doi.org/10.21956/wellcomeopenres.18592.r44048
© 2021 Villesèche F. This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited.
Florence Villesèche   
Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark 
This article adopts a Bourdieusian framework to frame and analyse the ‘scientific game’ related to 
infection control science in the Covid-19 pandemic. Specifically, the authors examine two 
transmission modes that have received highly unequal consideration: droplet vs airborne 
transmission, with severe consequences for how infection control is realised in practice. I find the 
article very insightful and rich and hope that my comments can help the authors improve the 
rendition of their reasoning. 
 
Overall, it is evident that the authors care deeply for this discussion, which occasionally translates 
into the paper making conclusions before providing the evidence. Also, and related, there may be 
possible amendments to better distinguish between the theorisation and the study results while 
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The starting quote is excellent and gives us a good sense of where you want to go with the paper - 
year missing in the reference, though. I also like that you start the article with a description of the 
phenomenon, what is happening, what an official statement looks like, and how it features only 
one possible transmission theory. However, I think it is a bit unwarranted to straight away state 
that this statement is wrong. I understand that this is, ultimately, the point you want to make, but 
you are jumping over some reasoning steps that would be helpful for the reader – not least if 
you're going to keep supporters of the droplet theory reading on. 
 
Instead, you could start by pointing out that this droplet theory is only one possibility, and that 
there is another one - the aerosol view, and that this alternative/complementary explanation of 
how Covid-19 is transmitted is absent from such statements, despite there being solid studies, etc. 
This is a valid and trustworthy starting point to wonder why another explanation would be left out. 
Indeed, if one of them contradicts the other or is not supported, then it is understandable. Still, if 
both are true, it becomes a health policy problem - that we will take decisions that do not address 
all possible ways that the virus spreads. 
 
My advice here is not to ‘undersell’ or tone down your contribution but to do this without jumping 
over some argumentative building blocks. In other words, I believe you can make your claims in a 
way that shows it is warranted that you explore this situation scientifically – and that the aim of 
the paper is not to show that droplet theory is wrong. 
 
Finally, the research questions are good but require the reader to be already acquainted with the 
Bourdieusian vocabulary that you only introduce later in the paper. Could you simplify these 




Being reasonably acquainted with Bourdieu’s work, I recognise its complexity and the fact that the 
different concepts are interrelated. However, it seems that you mainly use the concepts of field, 
doxa and illusio in your paper. I think you can drop habitus to simplify the exposition and 
argument a bit. Moreover, I think you should define what a field is and then immediately identify 
the three relevant fields, as this identification is also derived from Bourdieu’s work. Otherwise, it is 
a bit confusing why you come back to the notion of field and why you do not give the same space 
to the other concepts (cf. my point about keeping the number of concepts at a minimum). Then 
you can move on to explaining the concepts of illusio and doxa, and then what that means re the 
droplet vs airborne debate. You do not need any data to do this, and this is for me still part of the 
framing of your argument, which theorises the empirical phenomenon (absence of the airborne 
explanation from dominant discourses) that you exposed in the introduction. After reading the 
entire paper, it seems that you claim this is the first part of your results, but I think it is rather your 
starting point; it cannot be both. In the empirical part, you go more in-depth into how this 
unfolded in practice and with what consequences. Still, you do this based on the premise that 
there was an uneven representation of one explanation over the other in public discourse (this is 
thus not a finding, but a starting point). You can, of course, start your findings by noting that your 
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The micro and macro-level focus are well explained, and their interconnectedness is well 
theorised. This is overall an excellent section on which I have no further comments.   
 
Cases and Results 
 
Overall, I find that shorter descriptions of the cases and better integration of data and theory 
would make a more compelling contribution. On the one hand, the cases are quite long and 
contain most of the data yet are presented descriptively rather than analytically (i.e., presenting a 
reading of the cases through the Bourdieusian concepts). On the other hand, the results are very 
abstract and theoretical. 
 
Again, in line with my comment about the theory part (the need to theorise the droplet vs airborne 
debate), it is OK to say that your analysis confirms them to be two distinct positions and that 
airborne transmission is the heterodox one, but this is not the most exciting finding you have. You 
do not need all this data to claim that there appears to be a knowledge-base / a scientific field 
constructed as being non-valid, as being out of the doxa. Instead, thanks to your analysis, you can 
unpack the different cases, how this happens, and how this means interactions between actors in 
different fields, etc. The same goes for the starting paragraphs about Scientific capital and illusion. 
Again, you do not need data to make these claims, and you could integrate that in your theoretical 
framework section. Finally, I think you may want to give a bit more space to the emerging 
challenges because I found this very interesting in your paper – that there are interstices for 
change, that the heterodox knowledge can ‘penetrate’ the doxa by specific mechanisms. Also, tell 
us how this can be explained within your Bourdieusian framework, how this may affect the game, 




The discussion is overall well written and makes some additional points. However, I still have a 
question after reading the paper: what do your findings mean for the ‘game’ and with what 
(positive and negative) consequences for practice (including policy-making)? Also, maybe you 
could carve out a bit more clearly how your discussion and recommendations about 
interdisciplinarity align with your Bourdieusian framework or distinguish better between the 
discussion of your results and future avenues that you want to start discussing. For example, we 
know that interdisciplinary research tends to be both more difficult to publish and less cited. I am 
happy to be convinced by your argumentation. Still, I just want to point out that having plurality (in 
scientific and political debate) in the sense of ‘opening the doxa’ or making discussions and 
decision processes more democratic is different from claiming a need for interdisciplinarity. And, 
again, it is not clear to me how the concern for interdisciplinarity links to Bourdieu’s theory. 
 
Finally, coming back to the very beginning of the paper, I have a few minor comments to perhaps 
make your abstract more compelling and informative: 
 
“both a mystery and a scandal”. I guess it is not a mystery, or at least you have a theory 




The research question presented in the abstract already contains the answer. In line with ○
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some of my other comments, you have to show the public discourse is partial and partisan 
with your analysis. The only thing you can observe as a starting point is the absence of the 
airborne explanation from dominant public discourse. So, I would perhaps propose a 
broader RQ, such as: Why was evidence for airborne transmission side-lined in decision-
making regarding infection control policies? 
 
Methods. Clarify that you are not looking at country cases but cases in different countries. 
Also, it is not completely clear what difference there is between the theorisation and the 
application of the theories (operationalisation). 
 
○
Results. Political, state and scientific field >> I guess that is part of the theory, rather than a 
finding. Alignment at all levels with medical scientific doxa >> I think that is more the 
results. The droplet vs aerosol >> cf. my comments it is the point of departure that they are 
two distinct approaches, that you then theorise being the orthodoxy vs heterodoxy. How 
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Trish Greenhalgh, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 
Response to reviewer 2 (Florence Villesèche): 
 
Thanks for this helpful review. We’ve extensively amended the paper in response. 
 
We accept the criticism that our commitment to the issue occasionally led us to “make 
conclusions before providing the evidence”. The revision is more circumspect in 
tone—mostly by changing the nuance of the argument throughout and emphasising 
alternative explanations. We explain the detailed changes below. 
  
We’ve corrected typos – thanks for pointing these out. 
 
We’ve softened the introductory claim from “incorrect” to “scientifically questionable (and in 
our view incorrect)”. We’re not presenting the arguments for airborne transmission in this 
paper; we’re taking them as given and analysing the sociology of the scientific arguments. 
So we disagree that we need to “build up to” that as our “ultimate” position. It is our starting 
point. We also state in the very next paragraph that we fully accept that the science is 
contested. However, we do agree that the statement as initially worded was too blunt. 
Extraordinarily, there is no scientific evidence that droplet transmission contributes 
significantly to the spread of Covid-19. The waters have been muddied by the assumption 
that close-contact transmission was wrongly assumed to be due to droplets.  As the 
reviewer acknowledges, we don’t really want to get into the science of this here (we’ve 
argued it extensively elsewhere and we reference those papers), so we have simply 
softened how we present the term “incorrect”. 
 
We agree with the reviewer that we could drop much of the discussion on habitus to 
simplify the line of argument. We have done this in the revised version. We’ve kept in one 
paragraph where we explain this as a key Bourdieusian concept but removed the sections 
where we attempt to theorise the habitus of actual individuals. 
 
We did consider moving the first part of the results to the introduction and including it as 
our starting point, as this reviewer suggested. But this didn’t work because the description 
of the orthodoxy and the heterodoxy are findings. It took a great deal of analysing texts to 
draw out the assumptions and lines of argument in the ‘Orthodoxy and heterodoxy’ 
subsection. We agree however that we didn’t make this clear in the original submission so 
have added a sentence to explain that these are findings, not background. 
 
The reviewer suggests shortening the case studies. We tried but found it difficult as we lost 
nuance. Instead, we’ve deleted one entire case study (USA) to shorten the results section as 
this focused on a commercial organisation rather than public health bodies which was our 
main focus. We’ve reduced the length of the other three case studies as much as we can. 
 
In the Discussion, we’ve highlighted more clearly what our findings mean for the ‘game’ and 
with what (positive and negative) consequences for practice (including policy-making). 
We’ve also better aligned our discussion on interdisciplinarity with our Bourdieusian 
framework. 
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We’ve amended the abstract slightly in response to the helpful comments, but we’d like to 
respectfully push back on this part of the reviewer’s feedback. We would like to keep the 
word “scandal”. We know it’s an emotive term but we present it clearly as our starting point 
(the “background” to what we’ve done); we are not pre-empting our findings. In response to 
the reviewer’s question “it is a scandal once you have answered your research question, not 
before, right?”, the answer is no, it’s a scandal before we answer the research question. The 
research question is to explore why the scandal happened, not to determine whether it was 
a scandal. We wouldn’t be bothering with this paper if there hadn’t been a scandal to 
explore. Denial of airborne spread in the face of strong evidence in its favour has quite 
literally cost—and continues to cost—millions of lives. We agree however that the research 
question did somewhat pre-empt the findings and have amended as suggested. We also 
agree that the first sentence of the results in the abstract actually belongs in methods and 
have moved it. 
 
Thanks again for this incredibly helpful review.  
Competing Interests: None
Reviewer Report 04 June 2021
https://doi.org/10.21956/wellcomeopenres.18592.r44065
© 2021 Fang F. This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original work is properly cited.
Ferric Fang   
Department of Laboratory Medicine and Pathology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA 
The authors may wish to consider revising their article in response to my comments. Otherwise, In 
my view, the article may be indexed in its present form. 
 
Among the more important lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic has been the 
importance of airborne transmission, which has had major implications for the prevention of 
infection by distancing, face mask use, ventilation and the avoidance of crowds. This interesting 
article discusses the delayed acceptance of airborne transmission by the public health community 
from a sociological perspective, emphasizing the hegemony of the infectious diseases control field 
and its initial rejection of dissenting views from experts who primarily came from other scientific 
fields (e.g., aerosol physics, engineering and chemistry). 
 
The article illustrates a number of impediments in the way that public policy relating to health 
matters is guided by science, including tribalism, deference to authority, and dogmatism. It is 
perhaps an inherent feature of scientific fields to encourage conformity and exclude contributions 
from outsiders1,2. A landmark letter published by Morawska and Milton in June 2020 with 
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endorsement by 239 experts called on the medical community and national and international 
regulatory bodies to acknowledge and address the possibility of airborne SARS-CoV-2 
transmission3. The reflexive oppositional alignment of the infection control community is 
illustrated by the rapid negative response to the Morawska letter, with over 300 signatories 
insisting that SARS-CoV-2 was mainly spread by “droplets and close contact” and accusing the 
aerosol scientists of sowing “confusion and fear”4. 
 
That said, there are limits to framing this debate in purely sociological terms. As a unifying 
explanation for the dynamic between infection control and aerosol scientists, the Bourdieusian 
framework falls short. The writers note that Kuhn had little to say about the political dimensions of 
science. Nevertheless, a Kuhnian perspective would emphasize the relevance of entrenched 
dogma and the challenge of overturning longstanding paradigms in the case of airborne SARS-
CoV-2 transmission. Secondary factors, including political, financial and pragmatic (limitation of 
available personal protective equipment) considerations, also influenced early messaging relating 
to transmission and discouraged an emphasis on the possibility of airborne spread. Although 
infection control specialists may have been misinformed, they considered their views to be 
evidence-based. They did not reject heterodox views to defend the primacy of their field and 
defend their “scientific capital,” but rather because they believed their knowledge to be superior 
and interpreted their observations in the light of an anachronistic paradigm. This meant that 
some, at least, could eventually be persuaded to change their minds on the basis of new evidence 
that was inconsistent with spread by direct contact and respiratory droplets. The WHO and CDC 
now acknowledge that airborne spread of SARS-CoV-2 occurs and can be mitigated by adequate 
ventilation. 
 
Some bias in the selection of illustrative case studies is unavoidable. Japan is cited as an 
exceptional case, in which the infection control field did not dominate the debate. However, Japan 
was not alone, as a number of Asian countries more quickly accepted the possibility of airborne 
spread and incorporated face mask use into its pandemic response5. Nor was the public health 
response a monolithic one, as some infection control experts have cited the precautionary 
principle, helped to promote more widespread face mask use and sought to obtain more robust 
evidence of airborne transmission6,7. As early as April 2020, an advisory report from the National 
Academies to the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy concluded that “the results of 
available studies are consistent with aerosolization of virus from normal breathing”8. 
Nevertheless, the dominance of individuals with infectious diseases/epidemiology training and 
their shared belief in the droplet paradigm was self-reinforcing and led to groupthink in the public 
health response to the pandemic. 
 
Another important question raised by this article is the hierarchy of evidence. Evidence-based 
medicine, which is criticized by these authors, has made an important contribution to improving 
rigor in the assessment of clinical research. As originally formulated, EBM aspires to integrate 
systematic research findings with practitioner expertise to guide clinical decision-making9. 
However, over time the emphasis on randomized clinical trial data as a favoured form of evidence 
has tended to denigrate the influence of observational data, knowledge of pathophysiology, and 
expert opinion, which may have delayed the acceptance of airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2. 
While randomized clinical trials remain the gold standard for assessing treatment interventions, 
they are expensive, time-consuming, and ill-suited to determine the route of transmission in the 
midst of a pandemic caused by a novel pathogen. The limitations of EBM have also been noted in 
other medical contexts. For example, Tonelli has argued that clinical trials, pathophysiological 
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principles and clinical experience have equal epistemological weight and each warrant 
consideration in medical decision-making, depending on the circumstances10. 
 
The conclusions of this article are important. The delayed appreciation of airborne SARS-CoV-2 
transmission led to more infections and wasted time and effort on futile preventive measures. It 
will be important to learn from this experience so that future pandemic responses can consider a 
broader range of evidence with greater humility and greater acceptance of transdisciplinary input 
to avoid repeating these mistakes. 
 
References 
1. Casadevall A, Fang F: Specialized Science. Infection and Immunity. 2014; 82 (4): 1355-1360 
Publisher Full Text  
2. Casadevall A, Fang F: Field Science—the Nature and Utility of Scientific Fields. mBio. 2015; 6 (5). 
Publisher Full Text  
3. Morawska L, Milton DK: It Is Time to Address Airborne Transmission of Coronavirus Disease 
2019 (COVID-19). Clin Infect Dis.2020; 71 (9). Publisher Full Text  
4. Chagla Z, Hota S, Khan S, Mertz D, et al.: Airborne Transmission of COVID-19.Clin Infect Dis. 2020. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text  
5. Feng S, Shen C, Xia N, Song W, et al.: Rational use of face masks in the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
Lancet Respiratory Medicine. 2020; 8 (5): 434-436 Publisher Full Text  
6. Klompas M, Baker MA, Rhee C, Tucker R, et al.: A SARS-CoV-2 Cluster in an Acute Care Hospital.
Ann Intern Med. 2021. PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text  
7. Cheng VC, Fung KS, Siu GK, Wong SC, et al.: Nosocomial outbreak of COVID-19 by possible 
airborne transmission leading to a superspreading event.Clin Infect Dis. 2021. PubMed Abstract | 
Publisher Full Text  
8. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine: Rapid Expert Consultation on the 
Possibility of Bioaerosol Spread of SARS-CoV-2 for the COVID-19 Pandemic (April 1, 2020). 2020. 
Publisher Full Text  
9. Sackett D, Rosenberg W, Gray J, Haynes R, et al.: Evidence based medicine: what it is and what it 
isn't. BMJ. 1996; 312 (7023): 71-72 Publisher Full Text  
10. Tonelli MR: Integrating evidence into clinical practice: an alternative to evidence-based 
approaches.J Eval Clin Pract. 2006; 12 (3): 248-56 PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text  
 
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?
Yes
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?
Yes
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Not applicable
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Yes
 
Page 30 of 32
Wellcome Open Research 2021, 6:126 Last updated: 12 NOV 2021
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Yes
Competing Interests: No competing interests were disclosed.
Reviewer Expertise: Infectious diseases, microbiology
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of 
expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
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Trish Greenhalgh, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 
Response to reviewer 1 (Ferric Fang): 
 
Thanks for this helpful review and suggestions for further references. We’ve included some 
of the references in the revision. 
 
We’ve also responded to the comment “Although infection control specialists may have been 
misinformed, they considered their views to be evidence-based. They did not reject heterodox 
views to defend the primacy of their field and defend their ‘scientific capital,’ but rather because 
they believed their knowledge to be superior and interpreted their observations in the light of an 
anachronistic paradigm.”   In the revision, we point out that both Bourdieusian and a 
Kuhnian analyses assume, broadly speaking, that beliefs within a scientific orthodoxy are 
honestly held—precisely because they align with prevailing mental models. However, it is 
also the case that when a mental model is associated with a high degree of scientific capital 
(that is, when it is associated with power and prestige for the individual or group), the 
honest scientist will be less inclined to consider changing it. This is precisely the meaning of 
the term illusio.     
 
We agree that Japan is only an example of an Asian country that embraced airborne spread 
early, and that there are other examples; we’ve noted this in the revised paper. We agree 
that the infection control field isn’t monolithic. It included a few scientists who did embrace 
the heterodox position (we have published with some of them!). Nevertheless, infection 
control as a sub-field is currently showing an extraordinary level of recalcitrance which we 
believe requires scholarly analysis. 
 
We also agree with the reviewer’s comments about EBM and its hierarchy of evidence—a 
great deal of good has been achieved but the mental models have become entrenched and 
over-applied. We’ve published on this previously (1) but don’t want to get distracted into this 
issue in an already-long paper. 
 
Thanks again for taking the time to give us such a helpful review.  
 
 
1.         Greenhalgh T. Will COVID-19 be evidence-based medicine’s nemesis? PLOS Medicine. 
2020;https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1003266.  
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Andy Alaszewski, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, UK 
This article addresses an important issue, the primary mode of transmission of the SARS-Cov-2 
virus which has major medical and policy implications.  It uses social science theory especially the 
work of the French sociologist/anthropologist Bourdieu to explore why role of aerosol transmission 
of the virus has been systematically downplayed in medical and policy discourses.
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